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Abstract
To judge from wisdom literature and artistic production, the ideal man in pharaonic 
Egypt was as polite and even-tempered as he was well groomed. This article exam-
ines the evidence for warrior burials from periods when the state was decentralized or 
relatively weak and argues that conceptions of manhood in fact oscillated between an 
irenic ideal and a more violent counterpart. Drawing upon comparative case studies 
and advice given by Niccolò Machiavelli to his prince, I argue that hegemonic mascu-
linity in Egypt did not simply reflect the character of the times. Rather, rulers actively 
promoted the type of masculinity that best served their purpose. To an ambitious 
local ruler engaged in enlarging his core territory, it was beneficial to appeal to and 
encourage ideals of valor among potential soldiers and supporters. Once peace had 
been established, however, violent masculinities proved disruptive. Based on internal 
evidence as well as observations of authoritarian governments that aimed similarly to 
solidify their power and pacify their realms, I suggest that pharaohs and their advisors 
likely employed five specific strategies to neutralize potential competitors and trans-
form an honor-bound warrior aristocracy into courtiers and bureaucrats.
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1 Introduction
This volume of the Journal of Egyptian History aims to demonstrate the value 
of placing Egyptian social dynamics in dialogue with those observed in 
other places and times. The topic of masculinity in pharaonic Egypt has yet 
to be approached from a cross-cultural perspective. Restricting themselves 
to Egyptian evidence, Egyptologists studying the performance of manhood 
in Egypt have examined artistic, textual, and archaeological evidence from 
specific eras1 and have also produced valuable overviews of evidence drawn 
from numerous periods.2 As they indicate, the cultural ideal of Egyptian man-
hood appears relatively static from the accession of the first king of Egypt’s 
First Dynasty to the death of the last king of Egypt’s Twentieth Dynasty 
(c. 2900–1077 BCE). Whether depicted as strong and slim in youth or as pleas-
antly plump in middle age, the man who commanded respect in ancient Egypt 
evidently took care to dress in white linen, obtain a clean shave, and project a 
demeanor of benign competence.
In this diachronic and comparativist exploration of Egyptian manhood, I 
first present evidence—based on chronological patterning in the appearance 
of weapons as grave goods—that cultural ideals of masculinity varied accord-
ing to the stability of the state. Daggers, axes, and other weapons appear far 
more often in mortuary contexts during periods when the pharaonic state was 
nonexistent or weak than when the state was strong. Such patterning, if viewed 
from a purely Egyptological perspective, might prompt one of three explana-
tions. Perhaps the comparatively rich burials that took place under powerful 
pharaohs were differentially targeted by tomb robbers; perhaps the periodic 
absence of functional weapons in the mortuary record might reflect shifting 
ideas as to the purpose of burial equipment; or perhaps deceased individu-
als who had carried weapons might have been more likely to enter the after-
life armed. All three explanations undoubtedly contain elements of truth. Yet, 
given that this burial pattern is consistent over two millennia, the explanatory 
power of these theories is limited and occasionally problematic.
Placing Egyptian mortuary data in dialogue with the changing conceptions 
of hegemonic masculinity observed in other long-lived civilizations provides 
a compelling alternative perspective. Oscillations between a dominant manly 
ideal of the warrior and a competing ideal—that of the literate and culturally 
1 See Robins, “Male Bodies”; Parkinson, “Boasting about Hardness”; Diamond, “Theorizing 
Masculinities.”
2 See Sweeney, “Sex and Gender”; Robins, “Gender and Sexuality”; Matić, “Gender in Ancient 
Egypt.”
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sophisticated courtier or bureaucrat—occur in the cultural trajectories of 
Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and European societies. When weak states in these 
regions transitioned to autocratic regimes, cultural ideals of manliness trans-
formed in tandem. Drawing on sociopolitical observations of masculinity in 
these societies, on Niccolò Machiavelli’s advice to his prince, and on Norbert 
Elias’s foundational study of the evolution of manners in The Civilizing Process, 
I argue that authoritarian rulers—once their power is consolidated—have a 
vested interest in promoting an explicitly irenic masculinity. Gentlemen (or, 
rather, gentle men) are highly advantageous to a stable state.
It is important not to overlook cultural differences when drawing upon par-
allels from societies that differ widely in size, structure, and ideology. With due 
caution, I nonetheless intend to demonstrate that the pharaohs of the Old, 
Middle, and New Kingdoms would not have been unique in attempting to 
defang the very men who helped them attain power. The question of how to 
achieve dominance over one’s rivals is a pressing political problem. Ancient 
and modern evidence suggests that disarming potential challengers is rarely a 
sufficient response. Five alternative strategies, I argue, were far more effective: 
1) promoting rivals while slyly separating them from their powerbases; 2) elim-
inating or rendering distasteful opportunities for men to enhance their status 
through violence; 3) gathering elites at court and refocusing their drive for rec-
ognition and honor; 4) encouraging the cultivation of certain “feminine” traits 
in powerful men; and 5) inculcating in upper-class youth a reverence for hier-
archy, deference, and de-escalation. These strategies all involved or benefited 
from a grand design to reconfigure the public performance of masculinity.
2 In the Archaeological Record Weapons Are Strongly Associated 
with Periods during Which the State Was Either Nonexistent  
or Unstable
While depictions of males in art do not change radically over time in Egypt, 
the prevalence of individuals interred with weapons does. In the absence of a 
strong state, violent masculinity offers individuals or groups protection. From 
the perspective of a central government, however, men who negotiate conflicts 
and settle scores with weapons are dangerous. It is for this reason, I would 
contend, that in the ancient Nile Valley the prevalence of so-called warrior 
burials—in which individuals go to the grave with daggers strapped at their 
side or with weapons at hand—plummets the longer a stable state persists.
What follows is a necessarily brief summary of the culture of weapons in 
pharaonic Egypt from late prehistory (Nagada IIC) until the end of the New 
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Kingdom (c. 3600–1077 BCE). To save a few thousand words, the reader is 
referred to Figures 1–3, in which data harvested from Susanne Petschel’s cata-
logue of daggers (Den Dolch betreffend: Typologie der Stichwaffen in Ägypten 
von der prädynastischen Zeit bis zur 3. Zwischenzeit) and Vivian Davies’ study 
of axes (Catalogue of Egyptian Antiquities in the British Museum VII: Tools 
and Weapons I. Axes) has been presented visually.3 Daggers and axes are par-
ticularly illuminating when thinking about personal and societal violence 
because, in addition to using such a weapon in war for close quarter combat, a 
man might slip it menacingly into his belt in a civilian setting. Like a revolver in 
its holster, an axe or dagger strapped to one’s side serves as a warning to others.
The data visualized on the map in Figure 1 records the evidence for both dag-
gers and axes from times when the state was stable: broadly speaking, the Early 
Dynastic Period and the Old, Middle, and New Kingdoms. Certain reigns and 
dynasties, however, have been visualized in Figures 2 and 3.4 Specific dates are 
provided on the map, but all told the period of stability can be considered—at a 
minimum—to cover the better part of a millennium.5 Weapons were excluded 
from consideration here and in Figures 2 and 3 if they were models, made of a 
material other than metal, unexcavated, or could not be dated with reasonable 
precision. Areas of ambiguity make this task less precise than would be ideal, 
given that scholars differ as to what they mean by “Middle Kingdom.” For some, 
this label includes only the Twelfth Dynasty, while other scholars include under 
its umbrella the late Eleventh and/or early Thirteenth Dynasties. Thus, the five 
“Middle Kingdom” axes discovered at Dendera—a site that thrived during the 
First Intermediate Period—may well have been interred with their owners 
at a time when the late Eleventh Dynasty rulers of Thebes were struggling to 
3 Different catalogues provide slightly different information. As these two works aim to be 
comprehensive in scope, they should provide the reader with a sense of clear patterns. For 
data about weapons found in Predynastic and Early Dynastic graves, Gilbert, Weapons, is 
particularly useful. Because both catalogues contain material from these periods, however, I 
have not added Gilbert’s data to the information visualized in the maps.
4 Graves with weapons datable specifically to the First Dynasty, the Sixth Dynasty, the “late 
Middle Kingdom” (which often includes the Thirteenth Dynasty), and the first two reigns 
of the Eighteenth Dynasty—periods of relative insecurity—are visualized in the maps in 
Figures 2 and 3. If it were possible to date the Twentieth Dynasty dagger from Abydos after 
the reign of Ramesses IV, it would have appeared in Figure 2 as well.
5 This calculation includes the Second through the Fifth Dynasty (c. 425 years), the majority of 
the Twelfth Dynasty (c. 100 years), and the reigns starting with Thutmose I and ending with 
Ramesses IV (c. 345 years). Decisions as to where to draw the boundaries between stability 
and instability are subjective. For example, because the First Dynasty was the first central 
government imposed on the entirety of Egypt and likely involved a steep learning curve for 
both rulers and subjects, I have chosen to visualize its axes in Figure 3.
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figure 1 Daggers and axes excavated in Egypt that date from periods when the state 
was strong. The information is obtained from Petschel, Dolch betreffend and 
Davies, Catalogue.
ED = Early Dynastic Period (c. 2900-2545)
Dy 2 = Second Dynasty (c. 2730-2590)
OK = Old Kingdom (c. 2592-2152)
MK = Middle Kingdom and Twelfth Dynasty (c. 1939-1760, though
some scholars include the late Eleventh or the early Thirteenth Dynasty)
NK = New Kingdom (c. 1539-1077)
Dy 18 = Eighteenth Dynasty (c. 1539-1292)
Dy 19 = Nineteenth Dynasty (c. 1292-1191)
Dy 20 = Twentieth Dynasty (c. 1190-1077)
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subdue the country. Still, it is remarkable that at no site were more than ten 
weapons recovered. Moreover, two of the five weapons from western Thebes 
are daggers found in the tomb of Tutankhamun, while the only sites at which 
more than five daggers or axes were found—Amarna and Qantir—both served 
as royal centers and hosted a substantial military force.
Information concerning the distribution of axes and daggers during times 
when Egypt’s central government was weak or nonexistent is too plentiful to 
be encoded together in a single map; thus the distribution of axes is visualized 
in Figure 2 and daggers in Figure 3. Chronologically, Figures 2 and 3 cover the 
Nagada II Period through the First Dynasty (c. 700 years), the Sixth Dynasty 
through the Eleventh Dynasty (c. 365 years), and the reign of Senwosret III 
through the reign of the second king of the Eighteenth Dynasty (c. 345 years). 
While the seven hundred or so years that led up until the end of the First 
Dynasty is a long stretch of time, it should be kept in mind that the use of 
metal was relatively rare. Likewise, although the reigns of Senwosret III and 
Amenemhet III of the Twelfth Dynasty are generally characterized as stable, 
changes in material culture make it difficult to distinguish late Twelfth Dynasty 
archaeological contexts from those of the Thirteenth Dynasty. Weapons des-
ignated simply as “Late Middle Kingdom,” thus, often date to a time when the 
distribution of power within the country had shifted to the detriment of the 
central court.
From the data collected in the catalogues, a clear pattern emerges. When 
the state was weak in Egypt, individuals were far more likely to be buried with 
functional weapons (see Figure 4 for examples of warrior burials discovered in 
Egypt and Kerma). In times of generalized peace and prosperity, on the other 
hand, weapons interred with the dead—if present at all—typically took the 
form of models, which would have required funerary magic to activate. Prior 
to a discussion of how rulers in Egypt and elsewhere attempted to demilitarize 
societies in which individuals relied upon weapons for protection and to proj-
ect personal power, it is important to quickly characterize the weapons culture 
during the periods visualized in Figures 1–3.
From the Nagada IIC Period of late prehistory until the advent of the First 
Dynasty, various centers in Egypt appear to have struggled to maintain their 
autonomy as well as to expand their authority by virtue of strategic alliances 
and armed conquest. During this period, it was not unusual to find special-
ized weapons in graves, with maces coming to the fore both as weapons and as 
status markers.6 Indeed, it is notable that the ivory handles of knives and the 
bulging sides of large votive maceheads served as some of the most prestigious 
6 Gilbert, Weapons, 207–09, 214–15, 218–20.
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figure 2 Daggers excavated in Egypt that date from periods when the state was 
nonexistent, unstable, or fragmented. The information is obtained from 
Petschel, Dolch betreffend and includes excavated daggers that could be 
dated with some precision. (Additional information comes from Brunton, 
Engelbach, Gurob; Brunton, Qau and Badari I; Bonnet, “Kerma” and 
“Fouilles archéologiques” (1988, 1995); Dunham, Excavations at Kerma; 
Reisner, Excavations at Kerma).
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figure 3 Axes excavated in Egypt that date from periods when the state was nonexistent, 
unstable, or fragmented. Information is obtained from Davies, Catalogue.
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figure 4 Three warrior burials: a. Predynastic (Nagada IIC) burial in grave 836 at Nagada (after Petrie 
and Quibell, Nagada, pl. 83); b. Second Intermediate Period burial F/I-o/20-Grab 17 at Tell 
el-Dabʿa (after Bietak, Avaris, 15, fig. 10); c. Classic Kerma burial K 333 at Kerma, dating to the 
Second Intermediate Period. After Reisner, Excavations at Kerma, 169, fig. 46.
platforms for the earliest imagery of the violent struggles that led to the even-
tual political supremacy of Abydos and the rise of the First Dynasty. Daggers 
and axes were also on occasion interred with individuals. While neither physical 
anthropology nor the distribution of weapons suggests a pervasive militarized 
masculinity, Gregory Gilbert believes that the Early Dynastic state nonethe-
less moved quickly to redirect the manner in which men achieved prestige. In 
his book Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in Early Egypt, Gilbert writes, “during 
Predynastic times we have some evidence for a gradual shift towards a warrior 
elite, however by the start of the Early Dynastic Period we find that the local 
warrior elite are effectively superseded by military administrators who were 
probably princely members of the royal household.”7 In this light, it is of little 
surprise that the majority of evidence for First and Second Dynasty axes comes 
from the royal burial complexes at Abydos.
The quantity of metal daggers interred in Predynastic archaeological con-
texts, although modest, is impressive when compared to the glaring absence of 
such weapons throughout the remaining 800 or so years of the Early Dynastic 
Period and the Old Kingdom. It is notable, moreover, that daggers do not dis-
appear from the pictorial record. In the Old Kingdom they are depicted on the 
persons of kings, foreigners, and (very occasionally) Egyptian soldiers.8 Axes 
7 Gilbert, Weapons, 141.
8 Petschel, Dolch betreffend, 67, 69, 72–75, 77, 90, 100–02, 105, 276–77.
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also appear in battle scenes,9 and for this reason it is notable that so few have 
been found in the archaeological record. Old Kingdom Egypt was an authoritar-
ian state in which the court at Memphis closely guarded access to positions of 
power as well as to pools of labor and valuable natural resources. This situation 
did not change until the late Fifth and Sixth Dynasties, when economic stress 
and popular discontent may have occasioned administrative adjustments that 
allowed the heads of local patronage networks in Middle and Upper Egypt to 
govern their own polities—in return, of course, for taxes and acts of fealty.
Once the central state began to fail, provinces lessened and then abandoned 
attachment to Memphis and claimed the right of self-rule. Individual polities 
fought one another and crafted alliances, as they had in the late Predynastic 
Period, until two kingdoms formed—one based at Herakleopolis (the Ninth 
and Tenth Dynasties) and the other at Thebes (the Eleventh Dynasty). While 
Mentuhotep II of the Theban kingdom reunified Egypt, his dynasty failed 
shortly thereafter, and the state seems not to have found secure footing until 
the Twelfth Dynasty. During this period of relative instability, weapons once 
again are to be found in significant numbers in private graves. In what cannot 
be a coincidence, soldiers appear for the first time to have created personal 
monuments for themselves, and men also on occasion chose to represent 
themselves grasping a weapon rather than a scepter of power or other insig-
nia of office (see Figure 5). This evidence for a martial atmosphere is comple-
mented by an increased nucleation of settlements (perhaps indicating a desire 
to seek safety in numbers), by battle scenes, and by plentiful references to 
unsettled conditions in both personal inscriptions and literary retrospectives. 
Not surprisingly, increased attention to defensive measures also inspired new 
innovations in weaponry10 and a heightened incentive for individuals to carry 
weapons in both life and death.
When Amenemhet I usurped control from the last king of the Eleventh 
Dynasty, portions of the country required armed persuasion to accept his sov-
ereignty. Thus, in order to gain allies, early Twelfth Dynasty pharaohs honored 
the rights of regional rulers to maintain their traditional seats of authority and 
did not move to subvert this state of affairs until the dynasty was well estab-
lished. The imposition of strong royal oversight, the establishment of peace, 
and the cessation of periodic conditions of famine—as seem to have plagued 
the long First Intermediate Period—coincided with material signs of prosper-
ity evident both in the court center and in the provinces. Simultaneously, there 
is an abrupt change in the weapons culture as expressed in the mortuary realm, 
9  Bestock, Violence and Power, 226, fig, 8.2; 228, fig. 8.3.
10  Davies, Catalogue, 23, 35.
137Machiavellian Masculinities
Journal of Egyptian History 13 (2020) 127–168
figure 5 Early Eleventh Dynasty stele of a man bearing weapons, from Thebes; 
Metropolitan Museum of Art 20.2.29. Rogers Fund, 1920.
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such that generally speaking the only weapons borne to the grave were simu-
lacra. While elite individuals might be interred with wooden daggers and/or 
in coffins bearing depictions of axes and daggers, these model weapons repre-
sent insignia bestowed upon the deceased in an effort to aid their revivification 
as the god Osiris.11 Indeed, according to Gianluca Miniaci, who sought to dis-
tinguish the grave assemblages of the Second Intermediate Period from their 
Middle Kingdom equivalents, the relatively sudden appearance of functional 
weapons is diagnostic.12 Moreover, it is notable that in the Twelfth Dynasty 
practically the sole significant attestations of functional weapons occur at gar-
rison posts (namely, at the western Delta site of Kom el-Hisn and in Nubia).
The pendulum seems to have begun its return swing toward a decentral-
ization of power and a militarization of the populace in the very late Twelfth 
Dynasty, before the state finally failed sometime in the mid-Thirteenth Dynasty. 
At this time, both axes and daggers reappear in the mortuary record in great 
numbers, especially at Kerma and Tell el-Dabʿa—two centers that emerged 
as the strongest rivals of the Seventeenth Dynasty kings based at Thebes. 
Remarkably, despite widespread plundering, the percentage of individuals 
buried with weapons at both Kerma and Tell el-Dabʿa suggests that carrying 
weapons, for a substantial portion of free men, was a point of pride. In sectors 
at Tell el-Dabʿa, for instance, up to 50 percent of male burials still contained 
traces of a weapon or a set of weapons, such as a dagger and an axe. Given 
that no women or children seem to have received such burial gifts, Graham 
Philip has suggested that these armed interments “point to the existence of the 
concept of the individual ‘heroic’ warrior, and are thus symbolic of male high 
status.”13 Likewise at Kerma, George Reisner observed that virtually every sub-
sidiary grave of decent preservation in the three royal tumuli contained a cen-
tral figure with a dagger.14 Both Elizabeth Minor and Henriette Hafsaas-Tsakos 
have studied the distribution of such weapons and concluded that daggers 
at Kerma are associated with elevated status and quite possibly even with a 
warrior elite that constituted the kingdom’s ruling stratum.15 Interestingly, in 
Upper Egypt, a majority of weapons were likewise discovered in graves of men 
of Nubian heritage—likely Medjay warriors of the semi-nomadic Pan-Grave 
culture, who frequently served in Theban armies and tended to be buried 
11  Grajetzki, Tomb Treasures, 150, 152, 157; Petschel, Dolch betreffend, 279; Willems, Chests of 
Life, 205–06.
12  Miniaci, “Burial Equipment,” 263.
13  Bietak, Avaris 10, 14; Philip, Tell el-Dabʿa XV, 218–19, 225. For the 34 provenienced daggers 
and parts of daggers catalogued at Tell el-Dabʿa, see Petschel, Dolch betreffend, 297–98.
14  Reisner, Excavations at Kerma, 79.
15  Minor, Use of Egyptian, 159; Hafsaas-Tsakos, “Edges of Bronze,” 84, 89.
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together near the northern border of Theban territory (e.g., Mostagedda and 
Qau) or in its strategic centers (e.g., Balabish and Hu).
When the Theban king Ahmose reconquered the country and established 
the New Kingdom, Egypt’s weapons culture quickly reverted to the norms 
that characterized the Old and Middle Kingdoms. Thus, functional weapons 
(as opposed to simulated or ornamental versions) are only rarely attested. 
Given that young men were regularly drafted into a national army in the New 
Kingdom, and that many served for their entire careers in the military, this 
absence of evidence is more anomalous than in earlier periods. As part of their 
effort at internal pacification, it is likely that Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs and 
their successors made a concerted effort to separate soldiers from civilians by 
limiting their spheres of interaction.
3 Violent Times Beget Violent Masculinities
The patterning with which Egyptians took weapons to the grave strongly sug-
gests that violent masculinities came to the fore during times when the state 
was weak or nonexistent. Some of the most staggeringly beautiful weapons 
in pharaonic Egypt belonged to royal women. In general, however, situations 
in which women owned weapons appear to have been exceptional in Egypt 
and Nubia.16 The majority of individuals who owned weapons, and to some 
extent viewed these weapons as an extension of themselves, were male. States, 
it has long been recognized, have played an important role in monopolizing 
violence and channeling it into authorized avenues. In the absence of a strong 
state, however, adopting a violent persona could be advantageous. Like states 
writ small, men who radiated an aggressive masculinity utilized their strength 
to augment their property, retain their autonomy, and expand their author-
ity. Men known to avenge slights against themselves or infringements against 
what they considered their domain often commanded a grudging respect—or 
at least submission.
Societies in which the principal locus of power is situated in individuals 
or extended families are often termed honor cultures and are contrasted with 
cultures of law. According to Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen, in their study 
of white male violence in the American South, such cultures are generally 
prevalent in conditions in which resources are scarce or unpredictable and in 
which, due to an absent or weak enforcement of outside authority, there is a 
perception that the rewards of achieving ends by wielding force outweigh the 
16  Hafsaas-Tsakos, “Edges of Bronze,” 88; Morris, “Daggers and Axes.”
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risks. In such cases, taking the law into one’s own hands is also perceived as 
the most effective method to obtain redress. In such cultures a man willing 
to resort to violence to defend his interests earns respect. Indeed, this respect 
(or honor), intangible though it may be, becomes his most prized possession. 
In such cases, however, violence begets more violence, for honor is fragile and 
vulnerable to challenge. Thus, if an insult goes unanswered or an injury or 
infringement unavenged, a man might be perceived as weak and risk losing the 
reputation upon which his own position in his community has been built.17 As 
Thomas Hobbes put it, “Reputation of power, is Power.”18
Because power, if it resides solely in the locus of a single individual or fam-
ily, is easily unseated—and because there is both safety and increased power 
in numbers—there is a tendency in such cultures for like-minded men to band 
together in larger units, such as gangs, clans, secret societies, vigilante posses, 
or the retinue of a warlord.19 Moreover, once such groups form alliances for 
mutual interests or protection, the ramifications for individual infringements 
of honor multiply exponentially—such that an argument between two men 
might easily result in the deaths of many or even, depending on their status, 
escalate into war.20 China during the notoriously fractious Spring and Autumn 
Period, for example, was a society in which “any perceived slight was answered 
with force, [and] the segmentation of authority turned appeals to force into 
wars.”21 In an amplifying echo chamber, of course, wars create warriors, thereby 
reinforcing the cultural capital of violent masculinity.
In Egypt, Japan, China, India, Europe, and countless other regions not refer-
enced directly in this study, fractious sociopolitical conditions led to the forma-
tion of ever-larger coalitions. Over time, and after a great deal of internecine 
warfare, a single polity succeeded in imposing a monopoly on violence and in 
creating a society of law.22 Pharaonic governments in the Early Dynastic Period 
and Old Kingdom (c. 2900–2150 BCE), the Twelfth Dynasty (c. 1939–1760 BCE), 
and the New Kingdom (c. 1539–1077 BCE) achieved these aims in Egypt. So 
too did the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan (1603–1868 CE), the Han dynasty 
in China (202 BCE–220 CE), the Gupta Period rulers in India (350–750 CE), 
and various governments in Renaissance Europe. Such transitions took time, 
however. Coaxing order out of chaos—as peacemakers in the present day have 
come to appreciate—turns out to be exceedingly difficult.
17  Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor, xv–xvi; Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 76, 198; 
Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese History, 31.
18  Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 1.10, 54.
19  Pinker, Better Angels, 81–82, 216, 515–16; Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 16, 19, 200–01.
20  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 86–87, 202; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 8–9.
21  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 40.
22  Elias, Civilizing Process, 264, 269; Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 71–75.
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4 Disarming Violent Masculinities Involves More Than Disarmament
So, how were men in Egypt disarmed or else convinced under strong govern-
ments that weapons were no longer integral to their sense of self? While argu-
ments from silence bear little weight, no government edicts forbidding the 
private ownership of arms are extant. Likewise, government raids searching 
for weapons, such as occurred at least once under Ptolemaic and Roman rule 
respectively,23 remain unattested. Military records demonstrate that pharaonic 
armies often collected weapons from defeated foes, so it is not impossible 
that newly ascendant pharaonic governments confiscated the weapons of 
their new subjects. Forced disarmament of a civilian population that has no 
desire to give up its arms is notoriously challenging, however. Even among 
the Romans, laws forbidding the possession of weapons were rare. As Peter 
Brunt writes,
disarmament was neither practicable nor necessary as a systematic rule 
of policy; it was a mere expedient of no more than temporary utility, to 
be employed against some peoples at the moment of surrender or when 
there was some particular reason for apprehending disturbances.24
Even in modern peacemaking efforts, such as those undertaken in recent 
decades in Macedonia and Colombia, divesting a population of its handheld 
weapons is extremely difficult. Not only are small arms easy to hide, but the 
motivation to withhold them appears to be irresistible in situations in which 
an imposed peace is resented and viewed as fragile.25 Because of their realiza-
tion that forced disarmament is not only ineffective but also generates extreme 
ill will, the United Nations and NATO have generally relied in post-conflict situ-
ations throughout the globe on a strategy that pairs voluntary disarmament 
with incentives. Even so, results have been disappointing.
Among the most persistent barriers to successful disarmament, analysts 
have found, is a widespread respect for militarized masculinity. In popula-
tions riddled with poverty and other social ills, weapons tend to confer power, 
respect, and a radically enhanced earning potential on a man.26 Moreover, in 
such “Kalashnikov cultures,” the surrender of one’s weapon—often acquired at 
23  Bevan, House of Ptolemy, 297; Capponi, “Roman Period Egypt,” 187.
24  Brunt, “Did Imperial Rome Disarm,” 270.
25  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 21; Schroeder, Farr, and Schnabel, “Preliminary 
Report,” 11.
26  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 16–18, 22–23.
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the transition from boyhood to manhood—causes a “crisis of masculinity.”27 
In northeastern Uganda, following the seventh attempt to disarm the agro-
pastoralist Karamojong peoples in 2001, it was observed that “men experienced 
emasculation through the disarmament program, in that the men who gave up 
weapons were called ‘women.’”28 Not surprisingly, then, international peace-
makers have increasingly concluded that any attempt to transform swords into 
plowshares needs to be at least as invested in disarming cultural ideals of vio-
lent masculinity as in divesting men of their weapons.29
Such efforts on the part of peacekeeping missions and states are now 
often geared toward disentangling the concept of machismo from that of 
masculinity.30 Thus, in Rio de Janeiro, an organization known as Viva Rio pro-
motes the slogan “only small guys need big guns.”31 In an article published in 
Human Rights Quarterly, Kimberly Theidon poses questions that are vital to 
such a project:
Hegemonic masculinity obscures alternatives—not only the alternative 
masculinities that exist in any given cultural context, but also within each 
individual. How might we enrich both theory and practice by exploring 
the ways in which militarized men are produced and militarized mascu-
linities performed? How might we include strategies designed to actively 
reconstruct what it means to be a man?32
Theidon, and other proponents of the idea that changing cultural conceptions 
of masculine honor is vital to any foundational attempt to pacify a violent soci-
ety, would no doubt be surprised to be directed for advice to the writings of 
Niccolò Machiavelli.
Machiavelli similarly recognized that forcible disarmament—while helpful 
in the short term—would not incline a population to peace. Thus, in 1513, he 
advised the Medici family, de facto rulers of Florence, that
27  Schroeder, Farr, and Schnabel, “Preliminary Report,” 14, 19; Myrttinen, “Pack Your 
Heat,” 30.
28  Schroeder, Farr, and Schnabel, “Preliminary Report,” 10.
29  Myrttinen, “Pack Your Heat,”33; Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 2–3, 5; Cockburn, 
“World Disarmament?”
30  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 18.
31  Schroeder, Farr, and Schnabel, “Preliminary Report,” 25. Such slogans, aimed at disarming 
masculinities harmful to public health, are reminiscent of a multipronged effort in the 
face of soaring covid-19 deaths in 2020 to communicate the message that “Real men 
wear masks” (Hesse, “Making Men Feel Manly”).
32  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 5.
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when a prince acquires a new state that is added as a member to his old 
one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who were 
your partisans in acquiring it. These, too, it is necessary to render soft and 
effeminate, in time and with opportunity.33
Machiavelli, however, was not alone in espousing this tactic. Barely two 
decades prior to the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate, for example, 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi confiscated weapons from the peasantry, allowing only 
samurai the privilege of carrying swords. Anticipating Tokugawa policies, he 
proclaimed a monopoly on violence—prohibiting armed disputes not only 
among villagers but also among warlords.34 It was up to his successors in the 
Tokugawa shogunate, however, to transform Japan’s samurai warriors into 
cultural aesthetes and bureaucrats. Five foundational strategies, I argue— 
each Machiavellian in its subtlety—enabled pharaohs, shoguns, and other 
autocrats to subvert violent masculinities they deemed threatening without 
provoking those whose authority they undercut.
5 Strategy 1: Insofar as Possible Separate Powerful Men from  
Regional Powerbases
New rulers typically arise to power with the aid of vassals or allies, political 
subordinates who, in recompense, require recognition and reward. A first step 
in remaking manhood, then, even at lower levels of society, was for an auto-
crat to undercut the authority of powerful provincials.35 Control over both 
land and labor brought a local leader wealth, the capacity to field troops, and 
a potentially problematic sovereignty. In an honor culture—which privileged 
violence, economic independence, and the ability to mobilize personal con-
nections to avenge perceived slights—provincial elites constituted an ever-
present threat to royal authority.
Because vassals constituted a ruler’s most important asset—as well as his 
greatest liability—undercutting the authority of provincial elites without 
angering them required political acumen. One common tactic was to offer 
the heirs of noble families lucrative positions at court, where they would have 
33  Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 20, 84. Similarly, Voltaire once wrote approvingly of Louis XIV that 
he succeeded “in making of a hitherto turbulent nation a peaceful people dangerous only 
to its enemies. . . . Manners were softened” (quoted in Elias, Civilizing Process, 42).
34  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 151–58, 202–03.
35  Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” 83; Elias, Civilizing Process, 258.
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access to luxury and prestige goods otherwise out of their reach. As advisors 
to the king, overseers of the palace treasury, or generals, their access to power, 
renown, and fortune would be enhanced. In reality, however, such a reorienta-
tion from a state’s periphery to its core removed such men from the nexus of 
their own patronage systems at the same time as it transformed their income 
into a subsidy. The beauty of such a move from a state’s perspective, of course, 
is that allowances are dependent on good behavior and are easily revoked. 
Thus, states in fact increased their power to penalize vassals at the same time 
as they ostensibly paid them honor.
After the Tokugawa shogunate established itself as the supreme authority 
in Japan, for instance, it moved quickly to subvert the military and economic 
power of independent vassal samurai houses, which was rooted in their agri-
cultural land holdings. Each local samurai lord ruled as a king writ small over 
his own domain.36 Thus, the Tokugawa shogunate “invited” powerful vassals 
to inhabit the samurai quarters of castle towns and, depending on their sta-
tus, even the royal court at Edo. Like knights of the round table, these men 
would spend most of their adult life—honor intact—physically removed from 
their traditional landholdings, subject populace, and readily available mili-
tary recruits. To ensure their leverage over samurai lords, shoguns encouraged 
wives to accompany their husbands, confirmed the heirs of vassals in their 
rightful position, and allotted each son an annual income that reflected the 
ranked hierarchy of his house.37 This removal of samurai from their heredi-
tary seats of power, Eiko Ikegami asserts, is what initiated their transformation 
“from that of independent, high-spirited mounted warriors to that of sedate 
bureaucrats.”38
While tracing the evolution of Egypt’s administration in the Old, Middle, 
and New Kingdoms is beyond the scope of this paper, it is notable that large 
provincial tombs tend to disappear within a few generations of the instate-
ment of the central government, just as they often begin to reappear as that 
government’s strength wanes. Thus, while elaborate First Dynasty mastabas 
are known from formerly powerful polities like Armant, Nagada, and Tarkhan, 
these quickly disappeared, and for the better part of four centuries elaborate 
tombs were by and large closely clustered in cemeteries around the capital city 
of Memphis.39 Moreover, at the height of the Old Kingdom, the country’s gov-
ernance most often divided oversight of various regional sources of revenue 
36  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 353–54.
37  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 158–59.
38  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 21; for more on this process of creating an economic 
dependency, see 40, 160–61, 167, 182–83, 203, 337, 358.
39  Wilkinson, State Formation, 73, 86.
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and potential social power among numerous officials who were both based in 
and buried at Memphis.40
Due to the necessity for Amenemhet I to enlist the support of local leaders 
in Middle Egypt, provincial elites retained power in the Twelfth Dynasty for 
longer than is typical. There is evidence, however, that perhaps as early as the 
reign of the third king of the dynasty (Amenemhet II), the government had 
adopted a gradual strategy of attrition—awaiting the death of a regional ruler 
and then assigning his heir to a lucrative position in the local temple hierarchy 
or in the administration. A large-scale reorganization of the bureaucracy, in 
which regional authority was ceded to mayors rather than to governors and 
overseen by officials, accompanied this strategic reassignment.41 Finally, upon 
reuniting Egypt, the Eighteenth Dynasty again adopted a system that relied 
upon mayors and concentrated the most powerful government officials at 
Memphis, Thebes, and—later—also at the current political capital. Moreover, 
although lavish tombs at sites like El Kab in Upper Egypt and Fadrus in Nubia 
suggest that early Eighteenth Dynasty kings honored powerful provincial lead-
ers, it is clear that such men had even then been incorporated into the cen-
tral government. The conversion of “kings” into “mayors” in Egypt’s northern 
empire and of Nubian leaders into bureaucrats is well attested.42
6 Strategy 2: Eliminate (or Render Distasteful) Opportunities for Men 
to Enhance Honor through Violence
In the absence of a strong state, the ability to settle scores and avenge wrongs 
enhances the reputation of an individual or a group.43 In reference to the 
long period of internecine fighting that preceded the Tokugawa government, 
Ikegami writes of samurai warriors,
the effective use of violence and the ability to take conflict resolution 
into their own hands were important, not simply because violence was 
the sole legitimate expression of honor, but because it was an essential 
means of maintaining the samurai’s sovereign power.44
40  Moreno García, “Territorial Administration,” 94–107.
41  Callender, “Middle Kingdom Renaissance,” 163–64; Willems, “Nomarchs and Local 
Potentates,” 385–92.
42  Morris, Ancient Egyptian Imperialism, 6–7, 102–03, 108–09, 158–60.
43  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities”, 19–20; Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese 
History, 32.
44  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 34.
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If the ultimate goal of the state is to monopolize authority and create a 
law-abiding society, newly established states must move quickly to reduce 
the opportunity for men to gain prestige via disruptive acts of vengeance. The 
first step, of course, is to prohibit unauthorized violence, such that anyone 
who presumes to take the law into his own hands will find himself punished, 
instead of punishing. In order to settle disputes between individuals, lineages, 
or other collectives before they escalate, states typically establish venues at 
which impartial officials mediate between litigants in order to avoid violence, 
provide it with state sanction, or else delegate responsibility for dispensing it 
to state authorities.45 It is not surprising, then, that throughout Egyptian his-
tory, high officials frequently bore titles indicating that they had served as a 
member of an ad hoc or a more permanent judicial body.46
Even if a state successfully monopolized violence internally, foreign con-
quest still offered men a potential to utilize their strength and ferocity to gain a 
reputation for valor. States wishing to subvert such opportunities might adopt 
a variety of tactics. One was to pursue an isolationist policy, utilizing the pre-
rogative to mobilize manpower in order to pursue impressive building proj-
ects, which might or might not contribute to the physical safety of the realm.47 
Shortly after the advent of the First Dynasty, when potential rivals in Nubia 
were neutralized and trading colonies in the southern Levant were abandoned, 
the Pharaonic government turned its focus inward and kept it there for several 
centuries. The reorientation of its attention inward led to remarkably ambi-
tious building projects, resulting most famously in the Great Pyramids and the 
large-scale quarrying of granite and gold. As a result, quite conveniently, no 
one gained glory—save the pharaoh.
In many cases, however, isolationist policies were neither feasible nor 
desirable, due to the ruler’s own inclination to take advantage of the prestige 
and riches that victory would afford. An autocrat looking to make sure that 
he maintained a monopoly on glory had at least five incentives to amass a 
substantial infantry army.48 First, such armies, if disciplined, were difficult to 
defeat. Second, in order for such armies to emerge victorious, soldiers had to 
act with discipline, such that they moved in a coordinated fashion according 
to a preconceived plan. The infantry model, thus, devalued individual hero-
ism in favor of the sublimation of self into a corporate whole.49 Third, when 
infantry troops won battles, the victory belonged to a faceless group of mostly 
45  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 202–03, 220, 241–42, 248–51.
46  Lippert, “Law Courts,” 2–5.
47  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 158.
48  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 139–40; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 9, 244.
49  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 113.
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lower-class men, rather than to an assemblage of landed aristocrats and their 
dependents.50 Fourth, even where generals were concerned, victory could be 
attributed to stratagem rather than to prowess on the battlefield.51 Fifth, both 
infantry and general could conveniently be subsumed into the person of the 
king, as under strong autocratic regimes every victory is laid at the feet of the 
ruler. Indeed, it is no accident that in Rome the hallowed tradition of a victori-
ous general driving four white horses at a triumph given in his honor did not 
long survive the death of the Republic.52
It is remarkable how little is known about the achievements in battle of 
anyone save the pharaoh. Given the number of battles fought in the Middle 
and New Kingdoms, personal narratives from military men are few and far 
between. Indeed, one of the very few texts that sheds light on the individual 
experience of a chariot warrior in Egypt’s army is a satirical letter, in which 
the writer teases his correspondent for his “heroic” ambitions to serve as an 
elite soldier-scribe. Rather than achieving renown, the writer predicts that his 
correspondent will spend his tour of duty robbed blind, scared out of his wits, 
exhausted, and in pain.53 In the admittedly tendentious scribal literature, the 
professional soldier, too, was derided as living a life akin to an ass. Beaten since 
youth, subject to innumerable orders, overburdened to the point of breaking, 
and suffering from dysentery—the infantry man found his reward for services 
rendered to be the exact opposite of glory.54
A similar campaign to devalue the societal importance of military men 
took place during the Warring States Period in China, when governments were 
attempting to consolidate their power. Mark Lewis writes,
the disappearance of the fighting man as an actor on the field of battle, 
his absorption by the commander, and his transformation into an inan-
imate object, an animal, a child, or a woman all implied the denial of 
the ideal of the heroic, individual warrior that had animated the Zhou 
nobility.55
It is little wonder that Ramesses II could have claimed to have achieved victory 
at the battle of Kadesh “through my strong arm, I being alone, no high officer 
50  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 94, 97; Elias, Civilizing Process, 193–94; Roller, Constructing 
Autocracy, 99.
51  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 98, 104–06, 111, 133.
52  Roller, Constructing Autocracy, 100.
53  Wente, Letters, 106–09.
54  Caminos, Late Egyptian Miscellanies, 91–92, 168–69, 235, 304, 400–02, 477.
55  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 112.
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following me, no charioteer, no soldier of the army, no captain”;56 or that in 
Han China it was said, “good iron is not beaten into nails; good men are not 
made into soldiers.”57 For governments of stable states, the position of the sol-
dier seems increasingly to have been seen as akin to that of the merchant—a 
necessary evil. Because both occupational categories were useful, their prac-
titioners should be remunerated. To bestow honor upon individual soldiers, 
however, risked upsetting cultural ideas that increasingly privileged an irenic 
hereditary aristocracy.
The evolution of military rewards in Egypt illuminates this process of 
pacification. The battle scenes depicted on the ivory handles of some late 
Predynastic flint knives suggest the possibility that they may have served as 
military rewards for highly valued warriors fighting to expand Upper Egyptian 
power.58 If so, this practice was evidently allowed to lapse following the unifi-
cation of the country. Nearly a millennium and a half later, General Khuusobek 
boasted that Senwosret III rewarded him after a successful campaign in the 
Levant with a dagger wrought with electrum.59 Within a generation, when the 
state began to fail, daggers and axes that bore royal names and/or were made 
of precious metals begin to appear in private burials, which is perhaps not sur-
prising at a time when weak rulers were particularly in need of valiant men. 
By the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, however, such outwardly martial rewards are 
difficult to identify in either textual or archaeological records.
Early Eighteenth Dynasty soldiers boasted that they had earned rewards for 
the number of prisoners, horses, and chariots they captured in battle as well 
as for the numbers of right hands they had hacked off of men they had killed. 
After the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, such boasts are radically reduced, despite 
the fact that battle scenes routinely depict soldiers approaching scribes with 
severed hands—sometimes skewered on their spear like a bloody kabob. 
Moreover, from the Nineteenth Dynasty on, soldiers are depicted delivering 
to military recorders the phalli of uncircumcised foes along with the hands 
of their circumcised counterparts.60 Severing phalli during the heat of battle, 
one imagines, would have been virtually impossible. Thus, if military rewards 
increasingly accrued to those who harvested the largest number of body parts 
from indiscriminate cadavers, it is little wonder that military rewards failed to 
bring honor in addition to economic gain.
56  Gardiner, Kadesh Inscriptions, 11.
57  Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 47.
58  John Baines, personal communication.
59  Focke, “His Majesty Saw,” 11–12.
60  Schulman, Ceremonial Execution, 89–91.
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An additional aspect of military rewards in the New Kingdom is that they 
seem to have become increasingly and intentionally feminized. Archaeological 
evidence for the bestowal of weapons fashioned from precious metals and 
“flies of valor” stems primarily from Second Intermediate Period burials, often 
belonging to individuals of Pan-Grave or Kerman heritage.61 By the early 
Eighteenth Dynasty, however, inscriptions suggest that precious daggers and 
flies were complemented with—and, indeed, progressively replaced by—
rewards consisting of gold jewelry. As the New Kingdom wore on, golden flies 
ornamented the necks of queens and their courtiers, while military men and 
bureaucrats alike received golden shebiu-collars from grateful pharaohs.62 
Ambitious and martially-minded Egyptians would, one suspects, have shared 
the complaints of Julio-Claudian aristocrats that under increasingly autocratic 
rule not only did they have far fewer opportunities to exercise independent 
military commands but that military honors “were cheapened by being dis-
pensed prodigally and to the undeserving.”63
7 Strategy 3: Gather Elite Men at Court, Place Them on Stipend,  
and Refocus Their Drive for Recognition and Honor
One particularly effective way to defang a warrior aristocracy, as noted above, 
was to publicly acknowledge the prestige of such men by drawing them 
close to the king, thereby separating them from their regional powerbases 
and independent income streams. This strategy limited the arenas in which 
potential rivals might exercise autonomy and win acclaim. Writing about an 
analogous trend in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe, Norbert 
Elias writes,
These are processes acting in the same direction over centuries: loss of 
military and economic self-sufficiency by all warriors, and the conversion 
of a part of them into courtiers. . . . It was the pull of this trend that in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drew more and more warriors to 
the court and thus into direct dependence on the king, while conversely 
the kings’ tax revenues grew to such an extent that they could maintain 
an ever-larger number of people at their court.64
61  Morris, “Daggers and Axes.” For overviews of weapons likely to have served as military 
rewards, see Focke, “His Majesty Saw,” 6–12. For flies, see Gestoso Singer, “Queen Ahhotep,” 
79–84; Minor, Use of Egyptian, 146–47.
62  Gestoso Singer, “Queen Ahhotep,” 82–84.
63  Roller, Constructing Autocracy, 101.
64  Elias, Civilizing Process, 392–93.
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Such a strategy, however, was not without risk, as the honor culture that such 
men adhered to encouraged aggressive competitiveness with each other and 
potentially also with the king. For aspiring autocratic rulers who sought to 
transform warriors into courtiers, then, the vital challenge was to refocus how 
such men competed, with whom, and for what.
One strategy for cultivating “gentle” men is to significantly lessen the pres-
sure to achieve honor. If a state establishes and polices social boundaries, the 
scions of a lineage that arose to prominence by acts of valor are absolved of 
the necessity to defend their rights to the honor they inherited. Once repu-
tation is tied to birthright, it is far less easily threatened.65 In Egypt the ces-
sation of widespread competitive display at funerals, once Upper Egypt had 
been unified by the kings of Abydos, suggests that attempts by families to raise 
their status had either been discouraged or else abandoned as not worth the 
expense.66 Certainly, by the time the pharaohs of the First Dynasty ascended 
the throne, the social gulf that separated Egypt’s high nobility from its com-
moners appears to have been unbridgeable.
In pharaonic Egypt and Tokugawa Japan, a son was encouraged to achieve 
the rank of his father—not necessarily to surpass it.67 At court, however, 
attractive opportunities for low-stakes competition still existed. Status rivalry 
focused primarily on proximity to the ruler, who was ideologically framed as 
the uncontested center of the political universe. Courtiers thus strove to raise 
their status through the delivery of flattering speeches, the exemplary perfor-
mance of their official duties, or the cultivation of other qualities that were 
advantageous to an autocrat.68 The leverage a ruler possessed to enhance a 
courtier’s status with respect to his peers or to irreparably harm it through 
expulsion from court became a key tool of statecraft.69
At courts in Egypt, Tokugawa Japan, or Gupta India, changes in personal 
status could be closely tracked, because a person’s figurative standing was ren-
dered starkly visible by where he stood—quite literally—with respect to the 
ruler.70 In one of Egypt’s most famous examples of wisdom literature, set in 
the Old Kingdom but likely written in the Middle Kingdom, a vizier named 
Ptahhotep advises his son,
65  Elias, Civilizing Process, 395; Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 345; Lewis, Sanctioned 
Violence, 62–65; Castiglione, Book of the Courtier, 23.
66  Morris, “Nobles Lament,” 63–65.
67  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 161, 184, 269–70.
68  Ali, Courtly Culture, 264–65.
69  Elias, Civilizing Process, 396.
70  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 159; Ali, Courtly Culture, 114–16.
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If you are in the audience chamber, stand and sit in accordance with your 
position which was given to you on the first day. . . . The audience cham-
ber tends toward strict etiquette, and all its affairs follow (specific) rules 
of conduct. It is God who promotes one’s position, and that men should 
force their way is not done.71
In such circumstances, however, it never hurt to know the right people. In the 
reign of Senwosret I, for example, a palace official named Intef son of Sent 
boasted that he ushered in the great ones of Upper Egypt and placed them on 
their bellies. Officials, he claimed, “stood or sat according to my good will.”72
In court cultures where proximity to power brought honor, even abase-
ment could be elevating. Thus, in Egypt as in other court contexts, the highest 
nobles not infrequently performed menial tasks related to the king’s body. On 
the Narmer Palette, which depicts the idealized unification of Egypt just prior 
to the First Dynasty, one of the most prominent figures next to the king (liter-
ally and figuratively) on both sides of the palette is Narmer’s sandal-bearer—a 
71  Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 136.
72  Leprohon, “Self-Presentation,” 110.
figure 6 Narmer’s sandal bearer on the verso (left) and recto (right) of his ceremonial 
palette. After Quibell, “Slate Palette,” pl. 12–13.
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man whose accoutrements and hieroglyphic label strongly suggest that in 
daily life he held more taxing responsibilities (see Figure 6). So too in the Fifth 
Dynasty the owner of the largest private tomb in Egypt bore the title of royal 
hairdresser, while New Kingdom generals were charged with holding the pha-
raoh’s fan—and the list of honorific debasements goes on.73
According to Elias, elites undergoing what he terms “the civilizing process” 
vacillate between complex emotions—“resistance to the compulsion to which 
they are subjected, hatred of their dependence and unfreedom, nostalgia for 
free knightly rivalry, on the one hand, and pride in the self-control they have 
acquired, or delight in the new possibilities of pleasure that it opens, on the 
other.”74 Tacitus explores a similar ambivalence among the senatorial elite 
who served under Domitian by comparing their mindset to that of the Celtic 
population that his father-in-law, Agricola, administered in Britain. According 
to Tacitus, the Celts gradually gave up their warlike ways following their con-
quest, becoming accustomed to repose and luxury. Agricola educated the sons 
of Celtic leaders at court (just as the sons of pharaonic vassals and prominent 
provincial families were educated at Egypt’s court). So too he built halls of jus-
tice (the better for Celts to settle their disputes nonviolently) and rewarded 
behaviors he approved of, such that competition for state-sanctioned honor 
“made compulsion unnecessary.” As a result, Tacitus continues, “little by little 
they strayed to the seductions of vice—porticoes, paths and the refinements 
of dining. In their ignorance they called this culture, when it was part of their 
enslavement.”75
8 Strategy 4: Encourage the Cultivation of Certain “Feminine” Traits 
in Powerful Men
Seductive trappings of power, savvy governments made certain, were not dif-
ficult to discover in court settings. Elias compares European court culture to 
a stock exchange, in which a courtier’s honor rose and fell according to his 
ability to impress his prince.76 The situation at court in Takugawa Japan was 
much the same. According to Ikegami,
instead of competing on the battlefield, the [samurai lord] courtiers 
strove to improve their comparative standing in the honor ranking of the 
73  Morris, “Pharaoh and Pharaonic Office,” 209–10.
74  Elias, Civilizing Process, 274–75.
75  Quoted in Lavan, “Slavishness,” 301.
76  Elias, Civilizing Process, 398.
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shogunate court. They competed for even the most apparently insignifi-
cant symbols of honor ranking from the shogun.77
In the late Eighteenth Dynasty, one of Amenhotep III’s officials, who helped 
organize the king’s jubilee, boasted that he had enjoyed the responsibility of 
dispensing just such “insignificant” symbols to the assembled courtiers. At this 
ceremony, he remembered, “Rewards were given out in the form of ‘Gold of 
Praise’, and ducks and fish of gold, and they received ribbons of green linen, 
each person being made to stand according to his rank.”78 The idea of grown 
men vying for green ribbons and golden fish suggests that the pharaonic 
government was, as Machiavelli would later recommend, working “to ren-
der soft and effeminate” men whose power might otherwise prove threaten-
ing. Certainly, in Egyptian literature, art, and archaeology, fish ornaments are 
closely associated with girls and young women.79
It was not unusual for courtiers to be implicitly encouraged to explore their 
feminine side. Xun Shuang (128–190 CE), a Han scholar, wrote that “husbands 
and wives are the beginning of human relations, the origin of the king’s trans-
formation [of his subjects].”80 In China, obedience and compliance were a key 
part of assuming the role of the wife, but the wen—or feminine element—
possessed additional positive associations extolled by Confucius and the Han 
government alike: scholarship, benevolence, filial piety, respect, loyalty, and 
a knack for diplomacy.81 Thus, by inculcating typically feminine traits into the 
characteristics of the ideal man, the government served its purpose and simulta-
neously opened up space for men to explore a far richer array of possibilities for 
enacting maleness than would have been feasible during the Spring and Autumn 
Period, when men and women were defined in strictly oppositional terms.82
In Tokugawa Japan such state-sponsored efforts to remake gender norms 
did not escape notice. In 1717, an eighty-year-old samurai, who remembered 
the old ways well, penned an essay complaining about a softening of manners 
he observed in his younger colleagues:
In the old days, at parties, both upper and lower samurai talked only about 
warfare … now, on social occasions, they discuss good food, games, and 
profit and loss; those with some intelligence are talking about strategies 
77  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 159.
78  Quoted in Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 272.
79  Grajetzki, Harageh, 29–30; Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 17.
80  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 75.
81  Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 104, 111; Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 41–42.
82  The masculine wu-element symbolized brute strength, bravery, and martial vigor. Lewis, 
Sanctioned Violence, 43; Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese History, 13–18.
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for promotion, games of go and shogi [a kind of Japanese chess], tea cere-
monies, and [the composition of] haiku. The young bloods chatter about 
joruri [a type of music usually played at puppet theaters], the shamisen [a 
three-stringed instrument], and the reputation of the actors at Sakai, but 
they never discuss martial arts.83
As Ikegami notes, honor for a samurai no longer lay in physical strength. 
Rather, like the ideal courtier of sixteenth century Italy as described in 
Baldesar Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier, or indeed like his counterpart 
in Gupta India, eighteenth century samurai found their social capital aug-
mented according to their ability to converse knowledgeably about high cul-
ture, polite accomplishments, and frivolous entertainment.84 Thus, among the 
warrior class, a contentious culture—rife with quarrels and single combat—
had given way:
[to a] competition for alterations in one’s style of dress or the seating 
arrangement in the castles. The institutionalization of a status-oriented 
honor ranking system was the process through which the Tokugawa state 
gradually monopolized the determination of criteria of honor . . . The 
relation among men had become a relation among objects of honor sym-
bols such as seating, dress, and the amount of koku (income in rice units) 
that displayed a person’s attributes of honor to the outside world.85
In the world of the courtier, there was nothing metaphoric about badges 
of honor.
The feminized passivity that court life demanded of those it honored in 
New Kingdom Egypt is showcased in Figure 7, a reward scene that Mery-re II, 
a high official who served the Eighteenth Dynasty king Akhenaten, depicted 
in his tomb at Amarna. Here, too, the mixed attraction and repulsion of court 
life, as described by Elias and Tacitus, is also apparent. In the scene, the king 
and queen shower golden shebiu-collars on Mery-re. The bestowal of this pre-
cious jewelry is witnessed by a crowd that includes assembled representatives 
from foreign lands as well as Mery-re’s esteemed peers. Such a situation is 
made all the sweeter by the fact that others at court are not under the window 
 
83  Quoted in Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 261.
84  Ali, Courtly Culture, 143; Castiglione, Book of the Courtier, 41, 52, 81, 93.
85  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 276.
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figure 7 Mery-re II being rewarded at the window of appearance, being greeted, and 
returning to his villa. After Davies, Rock Tombs II, pl. 33; redrawn by Riva Weinstein.
of appearance but rather bent low before the king. Scribes, too, are depicted 
carefully keeping records of all these honors. After the ceremony the glow con-
tinues as an admiring crowd surrounds Mery-re, gazing with wonder at his new 
adornments and kissing his feet.
Mery-re’s honorific abasement with respect to the royal family is like-
wise clear. The noble, for instance, is the grateful recipient in the gift-giving 
ceremony—a position of less prestige. He is physically lower and smaller than 
the king and queen, and the gifts he accepts are handed to the royal couple by 
little princesses. Yet, like the golden fish just discussed, the “wearable” tokens 
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of favor bestowed upon Mery-re in this ceremony possessed the power to 
enhance his standing at court.86
Bedecked with gold collars, clad in an elaborately pleated linen outfit, and 
wearing a cone of scented fat on his head, Mery-re must have looked, felt, and 
smelled luxurious. Cross-culturally, courtiers have often cultivated a markedly 
androgenous aesthetic, likely because the soft, sensual, and artfully adorned 
body suggests material prosperity and a life led in leisure.87 Concerning Gupta 
India, Daud Ali writes:
Personal ornamentation in the eyes of people at court entailed not only 
jewellery and flowers, but an entire gamut of ‘body culture’, including 
body oils, pastes, cosmetics, fragrances, dress and hair coiffure. Anything 
applied to the body—garments, perfumes, ornaments or garlands—was 
considered to ‘adorn’ it, and a large number of the skills or ‘arts’ to be 
mastered by the [urban elite man] entailed expertise at various aspects 
of this elaborate regimen of self-beautification.88
This widespread obsession with, silk, foam baths, depilation, and other fastidi-
ous aspects of personal grooming and luxurious adornment for men is amply 
reflected in the archaeological record in finds of vials, hairpins, makeup pal-
ettes, and the like.89 Judging from the numerous cosmetic items discovered 
in tombs of men and/or marked with male names, the body culture indulged 
in by Egyptian men of means seems likewise to have been both elaborate and 
time consuming.90
The power of tweezers, oils, and the like to alter a man’s performance of 
his own masculinity lies at the heart of one of Egypt’s most beloved stories. 
The tale follows the fate of a hereditary noble—a “truly beloved royal acquain-
tance” and “a follower who followed his lord”—named Sinuhe.91 In essence, it 
86  Ali, Courtly Culture, 118–20; Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 62; Ikegami, Taming of the 
Samurai, 159.
87  Ali, Courtly Culture, 147. In Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier, 27, courtiers themselves dis-
cuss the degree to which an adoption of feminized aesthetics is proper for well-bred men. 
All agree that a courtier should possess grace, though they point out that many courtiers 
take this too far and “not only curl their hair and pluck their eyebrows, but preen them-
selves in all those ways that the most wanton and dissolute women in the world adopt; 
and in walking, in posture, and in every act, appear so tender and languid that their limbs 
seem to be on the verge of falling apart.” See similarly Castiglione, Book of the Courtier, 89.
88  Ali, Courtly Culture, 167.
89  Ali, Courtly Culture, 63–65.
90  Robins, “Gender and Sexuality,” 124–25, 133; Dubiel, “Dude looks like a lady,” 64–72.
91  See Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt,  54–66.
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is a tale of transformation in which an Egyptian courtier (who had fled Egypt 
after the assassination of Amenemhet I) marries into the family of a Bedouin 
chief, becomes a patriarch in his own right, achieves honor in a foreign land, 
and even defends this honor in single combat. In the end, however, because 
this was a story written by and for Egyptians, Sinuhe found life as a respected 
and successful warrior unsatisfying, and he longed to return to Egypt. The pha-
raoh granted his wish to be reinstated as a courtier and outfitted him lavishly 
with a house fit for a prince, a country villa, numerous servants, three meals 
a day delivered straight from the palace, fine things from the treasury, and an 
impressive tomb together with its equipment.
As Sinuhe’s circumstances were transformed, so too was his body. Sinuhe 
narrates that upon arriving at court, he received myrrh normally reserved for 
the royal courtiers. “I was depilated, and my hair was combed out. . . . I was 
outfitted with fine linen and rubbed with the finest oil.” Emerging from this 
makeover, Sinuhe the Bedouin chief transitioned back to Sinuhe the mild-
mannered bureaucrat, who trembled on the ground before his king and who, 
once bid to rise, was gratified to be “placed in the midst of the courtiers” and 
granted the status of “a companion among the nobles.” This event, in which 
Sinuhe passively and publicly received largess at the hands of the pharaoh, 
became—as it had for Mery-re II—the proudest moment of his life.
9 Strategy 5: Inculcate a Reverence for Hierarchy, Deference, and 
De-escalation
The fact that the story of Sinuhe became a canonical teaching text in Egypt’s 
Middle and New Kingdoms is significant, for the narrative provided the boys 
who copied it with two models of masculinity—one martial and the other ire-
nic. Sinuhe’s choice, the text implied, was clearly preferable. While skill with 
weapons might elevate a young man’s status in other less desirable milieus, at 
court violence was discouraged. Thus, he would have to rely on subtler arts of 
persuasion. By focusing on his education, a noble youth might hope to be suc-
cessful in courts of law, to be pleasant and entertaining at elite social gather-
ings, and—of special importance—to be relied upon by his pharaoh.
Nobles in pharaonic Egypt, as in Tokugawa Japan, often simultaneously 
fulfilled the role of courtier and bureaucrat, with the prestige of their posts 
closely tied to the level they had reached in the court hierarchy.92 This system 
was somewhat different in Han China, as a civil service exam —based largely 
92  Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 267–68, 273–74, 277.
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on Confucian ideals—determined the heights to which one could ascend. In 
all three systems, however, education served as a crucial gateway to power and 
respect. As one literate Egyptian advised his students, “Be a scribe, that your 
limbs may become sleek and your hands soft, that you may go out dressed 
in white, finding yourself promoted to higher status, that courtiers might 
greet you.”93
A prestigious position in the administration in Egypt, as in these other 
societies, meant recognition in the highest circles and access to a secure and 
impressive income. Moreover, while a scribe’s sleek limbs and soft hands 
would not strike fear into the hearts of his adversaries, scribal teaching texts 
counseled that living well was the best revenge:
You go down to your ship of fir-wood manned from bow to stern. You 
reach your beautiful villa, the one you have built for yourself. Your mouth 
is full of wine and beer, of bread, meat and cakes. Oxen are slaughtered 
and wine is opened, and melodious singing is before you. Your chief 
anointer anoints (you) with ointment of gum. Your manager of culti-
vated lands bears garlands. Your chief fowler brings ducks, your fisher-
man brings fish. Your ship has returned from Syria laden with all manner 
of good things. Your byre is full of calves, your weavers flourish. You are 
established whilst (your) enemy is fallen, and the one who spoke against 
you is no more.94
Teaching texts such as these offer unparalleled access to conversations among 
elite men about honor, masculinity, and the proper way to raise a youth so that 
he would flourish at court.
Long-lived, stable state societies rely on a literate managerial class to ensure 
that taxes are collected, labor is managed, and ambitious projects are overseen. 
The training necessary to produce simple bureaucratic records, however, let 
alone the sophisticated mathematical calculations necessary to raise obelisks 
or build pyramids, requires the type of intense self-discipline and deference 
to authority that the state was already eager to instill in its most privileged 
members.95 Students sitting for the Chinese civil service exam, for example, 
were responsible for memorizing 400,000 discrete Chinese characters, not to 
mention the main tracts of Confucian scholarship.96 In Egypt, scribal train-
93  Quoted in Vernus, Affairs and Scandals, 130.
94  Quoted in Kemp, Ancient Egypt, 355.
95  Elias, Civilizing Process, 380–81.
96  Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 48–49.
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ing was also arduous. In hieroglyphic script, the verb “to teach,” for example, 
was determined with the figure of a man raising a stick above his head—the 
same sign utilized in the word “to beat.” Between schooling and apprentice-
ship, a boy could spend sixteen years in training before achieving a position 
of authority, ensuring that he would have spent his formative years learning 
patient humility as well as proper grammar.97
How a student learned was complemented by what he learned. For the Han 
government as well as the Tokugawa shogunate—both of which aspired to 
safeguard their monopoly on violence—Confucianism offered an ideology that 
specifically privileged the virtues of patience, respect, and discipline.98 Thus, 
students in Han schools were set to rote memorization of Confucian tenets, 
while skills such as archery and chariot-driving (which used to be part of the 
curriculum) were dropped. Through intensive study of these texts, potential 
bureaucrats absorbed a deep respect for hierarchy—a hierarchy that, conve-
niently for both students and state, placed literate men above all others.99
That honor lay in literacy was a message driven home by Egypt’s scribal cur-
riculum. One much-copied text recorded the wisdom supposedly imparted 
by an official named Khety to his son as the two traveled to court to enroll 
the latter in “the school of writings among the children of the magistrates, the 
most eminent men of the Residence.”100 In the text, Khety advises his son to 
stay in school for two reasons. First, a boy who wielded a stylus “was greeted 
(respectfully). When he was sent to carry out a task, before he returned he was 
[dressed in adult garments].”101 Second, should his son complete his studies, 
he would be spared from painful menial labor. Then, to drive home his point, 
the scribe proceeded to satirize the fate of those who were not so lucky. The 
tone of this text and others of its genre is humorous, but the contempt for the 
laboring classes was real and resembled the attitude of the educated elite in 
Han China.102 Significantly, in both countries special scorn was reserved for 
soldiers. Such men were presented as uncouth, slow-witted, and miserable due 
to the hardship of their profession.103 Thus, for an irenic masculinity to sup-
plant its alternative, it seems that martial men had to be actively denigrated.
Khety did not stop with satire, however. Before delivering his son to court, 
he had important advice to impart. His son must at all times observe the 
97  Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, 444; Williams, “Scribal Training,” 216, 218.
98  Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 49–50.
99  Hardy and Kinney, Establishment of the Han, 74–75; Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 43.
100 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 432.
101 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 433.
102 Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 40, 46.
103 Yu, “Confucian Gentlemen,” 48.
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court hierarchy and show respect to those who ranked above him. He should 
never presume to walk directly behind officials or to make a request of a great 
man. Instead, it was wisest to obey orders and perform requested tasks in a 
straightforward manner.104 Other teaching texts offered the same counsel, 
together with the injunctions to remain silent unless spoken to, think carefully 
before speaking, and make one’s subservience clear through body language.105 
Interestingly, the distastefulness of this practice is tacitly acknowledged with 
reassurances that “the back is not broken when one bends it” and, similarly, 
that “the arm bared to salute him will not break.”106
A core thesis of Elias’s The Civilizing Process is that manners arose at court 
in part because—as a gathering place for social strivers, many of whom had 
been accustomed to settling scores with weapons—avoiding conflict or 
even the shadow of conflict (evident perhaps in how one might pass a knife) 
became particularly important.107 Manners had to be taught, and thus writers 
in Renaissance Europe produced numerous books that offered instruction on 
how to behave in polite society. In Egypt as well, scribal texts often combined 
wisdom with etiquette. Compendiums of advice in both cultures devoted sig-
nificant attention to how one should behave when invited to dinner in elite 
settings—a situation that appears to have been so fraught with potential pit-
falls that Khety had warned his son: “Beware of approaching the table!”108
Because a banquet can serve as a high-stakes testing ground for entrance 
into a more circumscribed social circle, the profound anxiety that invitations 
to dine often provoked seems to transcend cultural boundaries.109 As Matthew 
Roller states with respect to dining practices in Rome, “the convivium is 
not generally a socially egalitarian event: it tends to function as an arena in 
which status distinctions and power relations are established, confirmed, or 
104 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 436.
105 Advice concerning the necessity of monitoring one’s speech is stressed in the roughly 
contemporary Maxims of Ptahhotep (see Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 140, 145, 
148) and in etiquette books for courtiers and other well-bred people (Castiglione, Book of 
the Courtier, 71–72, 81; Ali, Courtly Culture, 131). Instructions on bodily practice in Egypt 
are given in the Maxims of Ptahhotep (Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 131), while 
in Tokugawa Japan, samurai who made improper bows to their lord faced legal sanction 
(Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 273).
106 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 143, 242.
107 Elias, Civilizing Process, 68–69, 103–07. See also Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 259, 272; 
Ali, Courtly Culture, 103.
108 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 436.
109 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 41; Roller, Constructing Autocracy, 5; Confucius, Analects, 
ch. 10.18.
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challenged.”110 In order to avoid offense and to ingratiate themselves to their 
hosts, young Egyptian men were counseled in such settings to practice self-
restraint: never eating without first being invited to start, never exhibiting 
any behavior that could appear gluttonous, and never being perceived to have 
violated proper hierarchy.111 Avoiding even a hint of threatening or aggressive 
behavior in elite social circles was evidently of utmost importance.
In essence, wisdom literature in Egypt encouraged young men of means 
to cultivate a masculinity that was emphatically irenic. The ideal man should 
maintain self-discipline, be stoic in the face of an insult, refrain from consort-
ing with hot-heads, and, crucially, avoid or de-escalate conflict. As Khety put it:
Do not come close to where there is a dispute. If a man reproves you, and 
you do not know how to oppose his anger, make your reply cautiously in 
the presence of listeners. . . . For he who hides his innermost thoughts is 
one who makes a shield for himself. Do not utter thoughtless words when 
you sit down with an angry man.112
In weak or failed states, in which a man’s honor was his most prized posses-
sion, failure to avenge a public slight would result in a catastrophic blow to his 
reputation. For an elite man in a stable state, however, it was his dignity that 
he strove to safeguard. Egyptian teaching texts, Confucian commentaries pro-
moted by the Han, and Seneca’s treatise On Anger, for example, all maintain 
that well-bred men should eschew violence, even in the face of insult, as unbe-
coming to their rank. Instead of sinking to the level of an angry adversary, an 
elite man should rely on rules of decorum that would judge any individual who 
would dare insult another in public to be so ill-bred that his aggressiveness 
would be his own undoing.113 One Japanese writer in the late seventeenth cen-
tury endorsed such changing mores, stating that “giving up one’s life for the 
sake of private affairs such as quarrels and fights is not the true way of the 
samurai. Devoting one’s life to giri [duty, obligation, or responsibility] is the 
110 Roller, Constructing Autocracy, 135.
111 Elias, Civilizing Process, 58, 76, 79; Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 133, 150, 240. 
Suppressing impulses and desires in such a situation was important to the Egyptians 
(Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 147; Leprohon, “Self-Presentation,” 108).
112 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 435–36. See similarly elsewhere in the instructions 
of Ptahhotep and Amenemope (Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 134, 140–41, 143, 
226–27, 231, 240).
113 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 131–32; Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese History, 
42–43; Roller, Constructing Autocracy, 280–81; Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 145–46, 
241; Ali, Courtly Culture, 94–95.
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way of the samurai.”114 Self-control in the face of provocation, thus, became a 
new point of pride.115
Once a ruler obtained leverage over potential competitors, indoctrinated 
and educated their children, and trained this new generation to love luxury, 
respect hierarchy, denigrate violence, and safeguard their dignity at all costs, 
his or her project of internal pacification could be considered complete.
10 Tales of Two Archetypes
Every form of hegemonic masculinity tacitly acknowledges the existence of 
other ways of being a man. A New Kingdom book of dream interpretation sug-
gests that the archetype of the perfect man might be classed under the head-
ing “Follower of Horus”—as opposed to “Follower of Seth.” The description of 
the Sethian man, designated by the name of the most uncouth and disrup-
tive deity in the Egyptian pantheon, suggests his routine violation of all the 
ideals enshrined in wisdom literature. Violent, decadent, debauched, and a 
womanizer, the Sethian man drinks often and to excess, is misanthropic, and 
makes sexual conquests of married women so as to enhance strife and enmity. 
And while he might be a member of the elite, even so his “tastes and manners 
are unrefined, unrestrained and earthy, like those of a commoner.”116 In the 
struggle between the archetypes of the violent Follower of Seth and the irenic 
Follower of Horus, the winner would be determined by the prevailing ideal of 
performative masculinity.
If only the first half of the story of Sinuhe had been discovered, one might 
assume that it had ended with the craven courtier having finally found his 
honor: leaving Egypt behind, ruling his own piece of a foreign land, and defeat-
ing a formidable challenger in heroic single combat. But this would not be a 
tale penned by a Middle Kingdom scribe. Sinuhe’s adventure required an epi-
logue, making it clear that no honor, in fact, could exceed the exquisite joy of 
following one’s pharaoh, the earthly avatar of Horus. Considering the struggle 
in Sinuhe’s own person between violent and irenic aspects of his sense of self, 
I end this exploration with a different story.
114 Quoted in Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 239–40.
115 Elias, Civilizing Process, 368–73; Ikegami, Taming of the Samurai, 207–08, 211, 258; 
Castiglione’s courtiers agree that “he who rushes into [quarrels or a fight] precipitately 
and without urgent cause deserves greatly to be censured, even though he should meet 
with success” (Castiglione, Book of the Courtier, 28).
116 Szpakowska, Behind Closed Eyes, 73.
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The Quarrel of Apophis and Seqenenre Tao is frustratingly but compellingly 
incomplete, a state that would have been remedied had it entered the scribal 
curriculum. The story is set at the tail end of the Second Intermediate Period, 
when “the land of Egypt was in misery” given that the Fifteenth Dynasty king 
Apophis, a foreign adherent of the cult of Seth, ruled Egypt from the city of 
Avaris. As appears to have been the case in reality, the Seventeenth Dynasty 
king Seqenenre administered Upper Egypt from Thebes as Apophis’s vasssal.
When the story opens, Apophis desires to render the treaty that stipulated 
the nature of relations between the two kingdoms void, without being per-
ceived to violate the terms of the treaty. His strategy is one of provocation—
to offend the honor of his vassal by uttering patently absurd and impossible 
demands. Thus, he dispatches his messenger to Thebes with a request that 
Seqenenre should slaughter the hippopotami in Theban pools because they 
disturb Apophis’s sleep. His plan, however, is thwarted by the patience of the 
king, who acts as if he had anticipated the counsel of the sage Amenemope: 
“Do not get into a quarrel with the argumentative man nor incite him with 
words; proceed cautiously before an opponent, and give way to an adversary.”117
What is interesting about this fragment of a story is its ambiguity. Apophis 
is clearly cast as the villain, so Seqenenre should occupy the archetype of 
the hero—but by whose definition? Given his self-control, he acts in accor-
dance with the behavior expected of the ideal man in the Old, Middle, or New 
Kingdoms. Yet if Seqenenre intended by savvy stratagem to subvert Apophis’s 
orders, his move is not foreshadowed. The fragment ends with Apophis com-
posing a second letter, presumably even more inflammatory than the first. If 
we knew nothing of Egyptian history, one would predict that Seqenenre, admi-
rably slow to anger, would ultimately obtain his revenge and pave the way for 
the genesis of the New Kingdom. Yet archaeology informs us that nothing of 
the sort occurred.
Seqenenre did apparently surge north as Apophis hoped, yet medical 
examination of his mummy demonstrates that he did not succeed in his quest. 
While opinions differ as to whether he was killed in battle, was assassinated in 
its aftermath, or was ceremonially executed, it is clear that he died a gruesome 
death due to multiple wounds inflicted by two different types of axes, a spear, 
and a mace.118 Thus, it was not Seqenenre who would live to fight another day; 
it was Apophis. If warfare was the ultimate trial of honor in a time of weak 
states, such as in the Second Intermediate Period, Seqenenre had lost.
117 Simpson, Literature of Ancient Egypt, 227.
118 Shaw, “Death of King Seqenenre Tao,” 164–65, 175–76.
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So how, then, did this particular tale end? And what did it mean? Was the 
moral of the story—presumably composed in the New Kingdom under a sta-
ble state—that Seqenenre should have followed the advice of the sages and 
remained unprovoked? Was there a different hero waiting in the wings—the 
king’s widow Ahhotep, perhaps? Or, as in the tale of the capture of Joppa, did 
a clever general end up saving the day with a ruse, thereby proving, once and 
for all, the superiority of brain over brawn and of forethought over fierceness? 
If so, this story—composed, like that of Sinuhe, by scribes writing under a 
strong authoritarian regime—could truly be said to be of its time. Political 
authorities, it must be remembered, play a strong role in promoting the type of 
“hero” most serviceable to their state.
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